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Abstract 
The article explores possible NATO enlargement to the East. The study is based on case study analyses and has two objec-
tives: to provide analyses of the dynamics of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic process, and to show how this process corresponds to 
existing experience and practice. Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, integration path, and domestic and external factors have 
all been taken into consideration, as have the degree to which Russia can negatively influence the eastward enlargement pro-
cess, and what candidate/aspirant countries can offer NATO to secure future membership. The authors present scenarios that 
are likely to affect domestic and international changes with regard to future NATO membership. 
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Introduction
There are still many loose ends in the discussion of the en-
largement of the EU and NATO; in particular, why certain 
countries wish to join these institutions, with no success. A 
huge literature on this topic has overemphasised interna-
tional factors in the analysis of the desire of these countries 
to join international institutions and especially the EU and 
NATO. In highlighting the attractiveness of EU and NATO 
either through the economic benefits that might follow from 
integration, or by simply assuming that such an outcome is 
both logical and appropriate, the role of domestic factors and 
the interests of third parties have sometimes been down-
played. Some studies, moreover, in analysing enlargement 
and the process of domestic reforms to bring institutions into 
compliance with EU and NATO requirements, have made 
controversial claims with respect to the success of the re-
forms. In case of Georgia, some observe that Georgia has 
made tremendous progress, while others claim that Geor-
gia’s reforms are incomplete. Against this background, this 
study aims to bring about a better understanding of the rea-
sons behind Georgia’s aspirations to join NATO, as well as 
the reform process and the domestic and external factors 
behind it. The reason we have chosen to engage in this dis-
cussion at all is the manifest desire on the part of Georgia 
to join NATO and EU on the one hand, and the failure to 
achieve these objectives on the other. Georgia furthermore 
is the only country in its region to have Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion as its stated policy, and even more relevant is the fact 
that Georgia’s political elites are unanimous in their desire to 
achieve this goal. What makes this case even more interest-
ing is that as a NATO aspirant country Georgia has unique 
circumstances and peculiarities; in particular: Georgia’s ter-
ritorial integrity has been breached—20% or more of Geor-
gian soil is currently occupied by Russian troops; over the 
past two decades Georgia has faced a civil war, two ethno-
political conflicts, and a war with Russia; Georgia is now one 
of the largest contributors among non-NATO member states 
in NATO-led military operations; and Georgia’s reformist 
policies in many fields has made her a champion among 
post-Soviet countries. 
All this creates a complexity of factors which are unu-
sual for an aspiring NATO country. This article is based on 
case-study analyses and has two aims: (1) to provide an 
analysis of the dynamics of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic process 
and how this process correlates with existing, experience 
and practice; (2) to adapt existing external and internal fac-
tors affecting the integration process. There are, in addition, 
some crucial questions to which we have attempted to find 
responses; in particular: to what extent can the Russian fac-
tor play a negative role, and what were the principal short-
comings of the Saakashvili government in Georgia’s NATO 
integration process?
We examine key issues within enlargement policies, 
such as European identity, conditionality, the motives for en-
largement, and the use of enlargement in fostering political 
and economic reform, peace, and democracy in an appli-
cant/aspirant country. In the case of Georgia we have ana-
lyzed different aspects of enlargement motives and related 
factors, both from the NATO point of view and that of the 
applicant state.
1. Georgia’s road to NATO
1.1. Georgia’s path towards membership: the 
institutional framework:
In 2002 at the NATO Summit in Prague Georgia officially de-
clared its Euro-Atlantic aspiration, thereby starting the NATO 
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integration process. President Shevardnadze confirmed that 
Georgia would be knocking on NATO’ door by 2005. (She-
vardnadze, 2002). Following the Rose Revolution in Geor-
gia in 2003, NATO-Georgia relations became more dynam-
ic. On October 29, 2004 the Alliance launched an Individual 
Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with Georgia to assist the 
country to achieve NATO standards and to implement dem-
ocratic reforms. (Forster & Wallace, 2001; MFA Georgia). 
According to the IPAP, NATO membership and integration 
with EU became the strategic objectives of Georgia’s foreign 
and security policy. In 2004, Georgia adopted a National Se-
curity Concept, which reflected new objectives and goals. 
(Shevardnadze, 2002). Georgia has had very strong internal 
support for NATO membership; a non-binding referendum 
held in Georgia on January 5, 2008 resulted in 77 percent in 
favour of joining the military alliance.  (Nichol, 2008).
Bucharest Summit: The NATO Bucharest summit 
(April 2-4, 2008) became a litmus test for NATO member 
countries on how to act further on NATO enlargement, and 
saw dramatic debates over whether or not to grant Georgia 
and Ukraine Membership Action Plans (MAP). The alliance 
was divided: Washington, supported by the UK, Canada and 
the newly admitted Central and Eastern European countries, 
was the main driving force for granting MAP to Georgia and 
Ukraine. Sceptical countries – France, Italy Spain, and the 
Benelux countries, led by Germany, were opposed to the 
next stage of enlargement. (Asmus, 2010). The Kremlin was 
certainly opposed to the previous rounds of NATO enlarge-
ment, but was forced to accept them under the firm stance 
of the united Alliance. Certain countries were not convinced 
that enlargement should be extended beyond the Black 
Sea, or that admitting Georgia and Ukraine into NATO would 
serve the Alliance’s interests. Germany’s view of MAP grant-
ing was governed not simply by the need to help Georgia 
and Ukraine, but also the desire to avoid any confrontation 
with Russia. According to Berlin, the issue of an expanded 
Europe was over after the ‘Big Bang’ enlargement; it was 
now high time to begin a rapprochement with Moscow. (As-
mus, 2010). In addition, Berlin took a very critical view of 
Georgian political and democratic reforms and military capa-
bilities, of the uncertainty of the situation in the country and 
of the ability of President Saakashvili to take weighty and 
balanced decisions on conflict settlement issues. As a result 
MAP was not granted to these post-Soviet republics; instead 
they received a joint declaration, a promise, that they would 
one day become NATO members. NATO always defended 
the principal of indivisibility of security across Europe. But in 
reality, as it became clear, geography matters; the West and 
the Balkans were treated differently by NATO and the EU 
than the wider Black Sea region. (Asmus, 2010). There is the 
shining example of Albania, which was granted MAP status 
during the Kosovo crisis, but which was at best two decades 
away from eventual membership. We can conclude that the 
designation of candidate states as prospective members is 
above all a political process and that conditionality and a 
performance based approach are secondary to the will of 
the alliance’s members.
1.2. ‘Bandwagoning’ and the Russian factor: 
NATO is a multi-purpose security alliance based on politi-
cal and military assistance between member-states. (NATO, 
1949). Since the collapse of communism, many countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe sought NATO membership. 
They considered themselves to be part of Europe, not only 
as geographical entities but as a part of the West, they ex-
pressed their readiness to promote democratic principles 
and European values, and they wanted to distance them-
selves from any Russian influence.
On the other hand, in the early Nineties there was a 
wide range of attitudes towards a readiness to accept central 
and eastern European countries as members of the ‘Club’. 
If Central and Eastern Europe including the Baltic coun-
tries were considered candidates for possible enlargement, 
south-eastern Europe and the South Caucasus were remote 
places, ‘...both in terms of geographic and psychological 
factors’. Romania and Bulgaria lacked western diasporas, 
and lacked also both the shared historical reference points 
and the skills needed to woo west European governments 
and publics’. (Wallace, 2000). The situation with post-Soviet 
states beyond the Baltic region – Ukraine and Georgia – 
was even worse. The post-Soviet governments were ‘less 
evidently the product of a clear break of the authoritarian 
past, their administration was less capable, their economies 
less advanced.’ (Wallace, 2000). Besides, conflicts in former 
Yugoslavia and in Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbai-
jan shaped the response of the Western governments to 
that region. In the meantime partnership with south-eastern 
NATO neighbouring countries has been intensified, the 
principles and practices of multilateral security cooperation 
around the European periphery have been spread, which 
has created a fertile ground for further enlargement. (Forster 
& Wallace, 2001). 
The main goal of enlargement was to provide “enhanced 
stability as part of a broad European security architecture 
that underpins the goal of an undivided Europe”. (Woodliffe, 
1998). NATO offered assistance to the candidate countries 
to complete domestic reforms, to raise economic stand-
ards, to improve military capabilities and relations with their 
neighbours, and to integrate into Western society. The first 
round of enlargement started in 1997 with Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic. The second wave of NATO expan-
sion occurred in 2004, when Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the alliance. 
The NATO double enlargement was actually quite success-
ful, especially with regard to the Balkans, where vertical 
expansion was positively tested for the first time. Horizon-
tal enlargement moreover assisted Romania and Bulgaria 
in particular to join the alliance. (Borinski, 2010). The third 
enlargement occurred in 2009 with the accession of Croatia 
and Albania. 
Opposition to any eastward enlargement of NATO has 
been a major plank in Russian foreign policy over the past 
two decades. It is the view of the Kremlin that NATO en-
largement to the East is counterproductive, posing a per-
manent threat to Russian interests. On several occasions 
Vladimir Putin has told NATO and US leaders that bringing 
Georgia and Ukraine into NATO and the deployment of an 
anti-missile defence system in Eastern Europe are ‘red lines’ 
for Russia. The Kremlin had several options how to respond 
to the NATO expansion: to use economic and financial 
means, trade sanctions, halting the delivery of oil and gas 
to applicant countries and member-states—heavily depend-
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ent on Russian natural resources, and as a last resort direct 
military intervention. In the cases of Ukraine and Georgia 
Russia has efficiently used all its possible resources to pre-
vent these countries from joining the alliance. 
1.3. Identity based explanation: 
Georgia as part of the West: The history of Georgia has 
been a centuries-long battle for the preservation of national 
identity and the Christian faith, of sovereignty, and of territo-
rial integrity. The top priority of all Georgian rulers was to 
seek guarantees for the security and stability of the country. 
Western principles and values became inseparable parts of 
Georgian life: deep Christian roots and traditions, a firmly 
based pluralistic and multi-confessional society, irrepress-
ible democratic aspirations – all these provide the basic 
prerequisites for Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic as-
pirations. The country attaches great importance to NATO’s 
role in strengthening the stability and security of the country 
and of the Caucasus region. It desires to become not only 
the consumer of security but the provider as well, playing an 
important role in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security.  (MFA 
Georgia).
Georgians have very strong ‘sense of belonging’, and 
desire to be members of the European family and the 
Western ‘Club’.  (Borinski, 2010). For other East European 
countries (Bulgaria, Romania) enlargement occurred at the 
political and psychological level, ‘where relatively fast and 
cheap progress towards enlargement was possible.’  (Borin-
ski, 2010). Georgia’s European integration by contrast rep-
resents a process that is more complex and dependant on 
numerous internal and external factors. 
Historical overview: Georgia’s geographic location al-
ways possessed a strategic importance.  As a Black Sea 
state the country historically played a political and cultural 
role in greater Europe. In ancient times Georgia was influ-
enced by Greek culture, and later it was part of the Roman 
and Byzantine worlds. The fall of Byzantium in 1453, how-
ever, meant that the Ottoman Empire and Persia cut Geor-
gia off from Europe and the Christian world. During the past 
three centuries, Georgia has made several unsuccessful 
attempts to build bridges with leading European powers to 
safeguard the country from neighbouring invaders and con-
querors. 
Fractured Georgian kingdoms struggled for self-preser-
vation and tried to pave the way towards Europe. The only 
practical way open to Georgian rulers was cooperation with 
Russia: ‘The Russian Empire’s annexation of Georgia [in 
1801], which Georgians viewed as a great tragedy, spurred 
the long-sought process of Europeanization, which reduced 
Georgian fears about the increased Islamic influence over 
the country’. (Kakachia, 2012).
In the 19th century, Russia served to some extent not 
only as provider of European values, and of western style 
education and institutions, it also played the quite significant 
negative role of inhibiting Georgian European aspirations. 
Soviet occupation cut Georgia off from the rest of Europe, 
and the country had no direct links with the major Western 
powers. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and re-
gaining independence in 1991, Georgia started to build a 
new relationship with Europe and USA. Despite the heavy 
legacy of the Russian and Soviet past, the lack of demo-
cratic traditions, inexperience in building the institutions of 
state or of a market economy, and a scarcity of financial re-
sources, even at this early stage Georgia felt driven dynami-
cally to seek a European future.  
New perspectives after regaining independence: 
European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations represent a part of 
the collective historical memory of the Georgian people who 
look forward to sharing bright future and values with their 
European neighbours. The establishment of a Western style 
democratic society in Georgia has become a significant part 
of the Georgian psyche and the country’s modernization and 
progressive movement has become synonymous with West-
ernization. 
Georgia’s European self-identification: The Geor-
gian people have a highly positive perception of Europe. 
Public opinion surveys show that almost four-fifths of the 
population would vote in favour of EU membership in a hy-
pothetical referendum and an absolute majority has positive 
attitudes towards NATO membership (57.5%: ‘very impor-
tant’, 22.7%: rather important) (Muller, 2011).
The analyses were able to confirm that a European self-
identification is associated with the presence of relatives and 
friends living in the West. English has become the principal 
foreign language in Georgia, replacing Russian. Thousands 
of young Georgians were sent to the leading educational 
institutions of the West, and over two decades Georgia has 
received a well-educated  and Westernized class of young 
professionals. Although strengthening relations with the EU 
is considered a top priority of Georgia’s foreign policy, in 
terms of importance for Georgia the EU ranks behind NATO 
membership and the restoration of a normal relationship 
with Russia. (Muller, 2011).
This means that national security and territorial integ-
rity are the main concerns of Georgians at the moment, and 
NATO and Russia rather than the EU are seen to be the im-
mediate tasks for the Government with regard to Georgia’s 
territorial interests. In the meantime, the conclusion of an 
association agreement with the EU is seen to be a step in 
the right direction. 
1.4. The Europeanization of Georgia: ‘top-down’ 
incentives: 
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the EU and NATO 
have played a significant role in shaping institutions, political 
processes and economic performance in the Eastern Eu-
ropean neighbourhood. European structures accumulated 
competencies for the introduction of market oriented re-
forms, trade liberalization, health, environmental protection 
measures, foreign and social policies as well as the protec-
tion of human rights and the fight against organized crime. 
As a consequence, both the EU and NATO significantly af-
fected the domestic structures of its neighbouring states. 
Conditionality and capacity-building represent the main 
stimulus for Eastern partner countries to adapt to EU and 
NATO requirements. The example of ‘external Europeaniza-
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tion’ and the EU’s enlargement policy are very often referred 
to as the Copenhagen criteria, which are a main precon-
dition for introduction of a liberal democracy and a market 
economy to candidate countries  (Borzel & Panke, 2013). It 
should be admitted that the Europeanization of Georgia be-
came the principal ideological tool of the Saakashvili regime: 
the government was trying to introduce new rules, norms, 
practices and structures. How Saakashvili succeeded in ef-
ficiently implementing EU and NATO policies is explained 
below; the degree of domestic change varies significantly in 
certain areas.  
1.5. The Priorities of the Saakashvili Government: 
After the Rose Revolution (November 2003), the Georgian 
Government began to develop a Reform and Development 
Program, where detailed objectives were to be achieved by 
appropriate legislative and structural changes. Georgia con-
tinued to harmonize its legislation with EU and Council of 
Europe standards. On September 21, 2006 at an Informal 
Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in New York, the deci-
sion was taken to begin the Intensified Dialogue on Mem-
bership Issues with Georgia (MFA Georgia). The NATO-
Georgia Commission held its first official meeting  just after 
the Russian-Georgian war. On December 2-3, 2008, NATO 
Foreign Ministers gave the NATO-Georgia Commission a 
central role in supervising the process set in hand at the 
Bucharest Summit in April 2008. In addition, the alliance de-
cided to develop the Annual National Program with Georgia 
(MFA Georgia). 
The NATO member countries at the Strasbourg/Kehl 
(2009) and Lisbon (2010) Summits reiterated their strong 
commitment to the Bucharest resolution. On 15 April, 2011 
the NATO-Georgia Commission emphasized the success 
achieved by Georgia in implementing comprehensive re-
forms and its contribution to the NATO-led International Se-
curity Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan. On 
December 7, 2011 the NATO Foreign Ministers adopted the 
final statement on NATO’s relations with partner countries, 
where Georgia was referred to as an aspirant partner coun-
try. At the NATO Chicago Summit held on May 20-21, 2012 
Georgia participated in ISAF, core partners’ and aspirant 
countries’ meetings (MFA Georgia). 
After the peaceful transfer of power in 2012 from the 
National Movement to the Georgian Dream Coalition, which 
was very positively assessed by the Alliance, NATO mem-
ber-countries continued to support Georgia’s NATO mem-
bership aims. The Wales Summit (4-5 September 2014) 
once again supported Georgia’s aspirations and approved  a 
special package, which envisages speeding up the process 
of Georgia’s accession to NATO and a significant enhance-
ment of Georgia’s defence capabilities, including capacity 
building, setting up a training centre in Georgia, and en-
hanced inter-operability opportunities (Wales Summit Dec-
laration, 2014).    
1.6. Why Georgia is important for NATO: 
Georgia has become a significant contributor to Euro-At-
lantic security and is actively involved in NATO and EU-led 
operations. In 1999-2008, Georgian military forces were 
deployed in Kosovo and Iraq. Georgia also participates in 
the anti-terrorist operation Active Endeavour, it became the 
largest contributor (with 1600 troops) among the non-NATO 
states in the ISAF operation, and in 2014 Georgia agreed 
to send a military mission to the Central African Republic in 
connection with EU crisis management operations (EUFOR 
RCA).
1.7. The impact of Russian aggression on the 
integration process:
 
NATO officials have frequently declared that no third country 
has the right of veto concerning NATO decisions, but recent 
events have proved that Russia is indeed able to influence 
the decision-making process. Initiatives taken by NATO and 
the EU both during and after the Russia-Georgia war in Au-
gust 2008 emphasized the irreplaceable and significant role 
of both NATO and the EU in building stability in Georgia and 
the region. On August 19, 2008, NATO Foreign Ministers 
unanimously condemned Russia’s actions and the EU Moni-
toring Mission was set up to promote security and stability 
in Georgia. The Russian-Georgian war did however raise 
concerns among certain European NATO member-states 
over the Georgian government’s predictability and diplomat-
ic capabilities in conflict prevention and peaceful settlement 
of existing disputes, in particular in relations with Russia. In 
addition, Georgia made a lot of mistakes that contributed 
to the war. ‘The list of Georgian mistakes goes on and on. 
Tbilisi’s handling of its relations with Russia, destined to be 
difficult, could have been better. Luke-warm European sup-
port for Georgia was not just a function of appeasement, as 
Georgian officials suggested from time to time. It reflected 
real doubts about Tbilisi’s democratic reforms at home and 
the weaknesses of Georgian diplomacy (Asmus, 2010).
President Saakashvili took a decision on the night of 
August 7 that resulted in a full-scale war between the two 
countries. It had catastrophic consequences for Georgia 
and without any doubt negatively influenced Georgia’s pro-
spective NATO membership. Russia launched a war against 
Georgia for quite clear strategic and geopolitical objectives: 
expelling Georgian troops and terminating Georgian sover-
eignty in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; preventing Georgia 
from joining NATO, and sending a strong signal to Ukraine 
that further striving for NATO membership on its part might 
lead to conflict with Russia and its dismemberment; increas-
ing Russia’s control of the Caucasus region; retaliation for 
the expulsion of Russian military bases from Georgian soil, 
and for Western recognition of Kosovo’s independence; 
weakening and possibly toppling the pro-western Saakash-
vili government (Asmus, 2010). 
Russia succeeded in attacking a country that had been 
regarded as a potential candidate for NATO membership. 
Russian aggression against Georgia showed the weak-
nesses of the NATO security umbrella in South-Eastern Eu-
rope; it became evident that Russia could use force against 
its neighbours with relative impunity. Some NATO member 
countries – ‘friends of Russia’ in Europe (Germany, France, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Spain and Italy) – saw in the war a 
vindication of their opposition to Georgia’s NATO member-
ship, which should be regarded as selective indications of 
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‘Realpolitik’ in Eastern Europe. Russia succeeded in Ukraine 
as well: Yanukovich’s Party of the Regions effectively sided 
with Russia during the war showing how destructive were 
the results of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration policy, and 
came to power in 2010. It set Ukraine’s neutrality in law, in-
cluding non-membership of NATO, and granted new privi-
leged terms to the Russian fleet in Sevastopol, to stay in 
Ukraine until 2042 (Cohen & Hamilton, 2011).    
                     
1.8. Russia’s new strategic security requirements 
and ‘the area of privileged interests’:
The sovereignty of ex-Soviet states became rigidly condi-
tioned after the latest revolution in Ukraine (January-Feb-
ruary 2014), the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Russia’s 
further defragmentation attempts of Ukraine, and her mili-
tary intervention in Eastern Ukraine, aimed at incorporat-
ing new Russian speaking regions. Russia has introduced 
new international rules according to which all EU Eastern 
Partner countries should behave in the interests of Russia, 
and this area should be considered to be an area of Rus-
sia’s privileged interests. The three Baltic republics of the 
former Soviet Union have somehow been accepted as EU 
and NATO members by Russia (yet there is no guarantee). 
However, it became clear that in case of ‘crossing a red line’ 
(e.g. NATO and EU membership, attempts to deploy NATO 
military bases or antimissile systems in neighbouring states) 
by other post-Soviet countries, Russia will act. In August 
2008, the desire to act was first demonstrated in Georgia, 
then in 2014 in Ukraine. Now it is Georgia’s turn again: on 24 
November 2014 Russia and Abkhazia signed the Treaty on 
Allied Relations and Strategic Partnership, which means the 
creation of a common defence and security area in Abkhazia 
and further de facto annexation of the Georgian province. 
It has recently been emphatically demonstrated that 
anyone who decides to ‘cross the red line’ in the post-So-
viet space as fixed by the Kremlin, should be ready for a 
real confrontation with Russia, including armed conflict. As 
President Putin explained during his annual special Direct 
Line: ‘When the infrastructure of a military bloc (NATO) ap-
proaches Russia’s borders, we must take certain steps … If 
Ukraine is drawn into NATO at some time in the future and 
NATO ships dock in Sevastopol, this would be geopolitically 
sensitive for Russia because, in this way, Russia might well 
be ousted from the region. In these circumstances therefore 
Russia had to react accordingly’ (Putin, 2014). Vladimir Pu-
tin’s message has actually albeit reluctantly been accepted 
by the NATO key players. As President Obama recently clar-
ified: ‘I think that neither Ukraine nor Georgia are currently 
on a path to NATO membership and there has not been 
any immediate plans for expansion of NATO’s membership’ 
(Obama, 2014). It became clear that many NATO member 
countries will not be ready to accept Georgia’s membership 
in the foreseeable future because of Russia’s position, and 
this position will apply to other post-Soviet countries as well. 
             
1.9. The shortcomings of the process and 
membership impediments: 
On many occasions leaders of NATO member-states, as well 
as NATO representatives, expressed their concerns over 
the shortcomings of Georgia’s integration process. In par-
ticular, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
stressed at the North Atlantic Council meeting held in Batumi 
that ‘...we have clearly laid out further work which is still re-
quired; in areas such as electoral reform, strengthening the 
rule of law, deepening reforms regarding judiciary and the 
media, and greater involvement of civil society’ (Rasmus-
sen, 2011). Certainly, the Saakashvili government did not 
pay sufficient attention to the concerns raised by Western 
leaders, non-governmental organisations, and opposition 
political forces which led to heavy losses on the part of the 
ruling United National Movement during the parliamentary 
elections of 2012. Saakashvili’s government paid lip-service 
to the urgent need to join NATO, and even aggressively re-
quested MAP and speedy accession to the organization. In 
reality, however, many requested reforms in such areas as 
nurturing of democratic institutions, the protection of human 
rights, the independence of media and judiciary, fighting cor-
ruption on an elite level, treating opposition forces and politi-
cal rivals with respect, were not implemented. The situation 
in the field of defence was no better. A politicised defence 
system, poor civil control of military forces, scandals over 
the procurement of military hardware, mismanagement of 
budgetary resources, numerous abuses of the rights of mili-
tary personnel, etc. were revealed in the Ministry of Defence 
and among the Georgian military forces as soon as the new 
government came into power (Aladashvili, 2012; Alasania, 
2013). Many supporters of NATO enlargement argue that it 
will help to spread democracy in Eastern Europe. The Geor-
gian experience demonstrates however that despite invest-
ing a lot of resources into building up a modern democratic 
society, in reality ‘the beacon of democracy’ was flipping be-
tween democracy and autocracy with all the consequences 
one might expect (Reiter, 2001).
After the Georgian 2012 elections, many political cir-
cles in Western capitals were concerned about the direc-
tion of Georgia’s new domestic politics. The former prime 
minister Bidzina Ivanishvili and then the new prime minister 
Irakli Garibashvili have been trying to convince EU/NATO 
member-countries that the new government is not going to 
change its foreign policy priorities. Many EU/NATO leaders 
have however expressed their concern regarding the nu-
merous arrests of former key official and political figures. 
(Rasmussen, NATO, 2012) In 2014 Saakashvili was sum-
moned for interrogation to the Prosecutor General’s office 
and criminal charges have been filed against him in absen-
tia; the sword of Ivanishvili/Garibashvili justice was hanging 
over Saakashvili’s head, which further exacerbated Western 
reactions. 
The situation was further complicated when, on Novem-
ber 4, 2014, the prime minister Irakli Garibashvili sacked 
the defence minister Irakli Alasania, who was dismissed af-
ter high-ranking officials of the ministry had been charged 
with corruption.  The dismissal of this pro-Western Minister 
led to a crisis within the ruling coalition: close associates 
of Alasania: the foreign minister Maia Panjikidze and state 
minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration Aleksi 
Petriashvili have resigned, and the Free Democrats party 
has left the coalition. Irakli Alasania denied all charges and 
stressed that the arrests of several defence ministry officials 
are politically motivated and represent an ‘attack on Geor-
gia’s Euro-Atlantic choice’ (Reuters, 2014).
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The ruling Georgian Dream coalition has sought to 
improve ties with Moscow and at the same time keeping 
the same pace of integration with Brussels: a priori quite 
an unachievable mission. Unlike Saakashvili, the new gov-
ernment has significantly softened its diplomatic language 
with the Kremlin, did not join sanctions against Russia over 
Ukraine, opened new channels of political communica-
tion (the Abashidze-Karasin talks) between Moscow and 
Tbilisi, and boosted bilateral trade (actually welcomed by 
NATO and EU). While economic relations have improved, 
political ties have remained frozen because of, on the one 
hand, Moscow’s refusal to compromise on Georgia’s goal of 
NATO membership and her having signed the Association 
agreement with the EU and, on the other, Tbilisi’s demand 
that recognition of two Georgian provinces as independent 
states be withdrawn. The new deal, which was concluded 
between Moscow and Sokhumi aiming at the de facto an-
nexation of Abkhazia, means that Georgia’s foreign policy 
aimed at pleasing the Kremlin to a certain degree, and im-
proving relations with Moscow, did not yield any significant 
results and has reached deadlock. The government’s princi-
ple of ‘not to tease the goose’ did not work this time.  
Conclusion:
NATO with its eastward expansion is gradually extending the 
Western system of security across the European continent. 
This process goes in parallel with the establishment of West-
ern democratic values and social and economic standards 
in the wider European region. NATO and EU enlargement 
set the foundation for stability, prosperity and development 
of South-East European region. In the meantime, there can 
be no doubt that the war with Russia in August 2008, the 
annexation of Crimea, the war in Eastern Ukraine, and the 
Russian factor in general have played quite a negative role in 
Georgia’s accession to NATO, and have significantly slowed 
down the membership process. Despite the fact that many 
NATO officials declared that no third party, including Rus-
sia, can veto the membership of applicant countries, certain 
NATO member-countries have no desire to complicate their 
relationship with Russia on account of Georgia. Another 
obstacle in the way of Georgia’s NATO membership is the 
occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the deploy-
ment of Russian military in these Georgian provinces, which 
would conflict with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the 
case of Georgia’s membership. It is evident that the abuse 
of power by Saakashvili regime played quite a negative role 
where acceleration of NATO integration was concerned. Af-
ter the October 2012 elections the peaceful transfer of pow-
er to the Georgian Dream coalition was well accepted by the 
NATO member countries, and generally played a positive 
role in NATO-Georgian relations. The post-election arrests 
of many high ranking officials, however, gave rise to criticism 
at NATO headquarters and in the international media. The 
Ivanishvli/Garibashvili government’s expectation of immedi-
ate improvement in the Russian-Georgian relationship was 
certainly premature. The Kremlin’s request to start building 
a new relationship with Georgia as soon as the new gov-
ernment came to power have not yet contributed to a rap-
prochement, and the expectations of the new regime were 
definitely exaggerated. Now it has become clear that Russia 
is determined to play a zero-sum game in post-Soviet space, 
and does not want to compromise its nationalist and impe-
rialist principles. However, with fine and filigree diplomatic 
work, a new bilateral relationship with Moscow can be built 
up, possibly in the distant future, with a new Russian leader-
ship who will replace Putin and his regime, and which will be 
based on confidence-building, and mutual trust that allows 
the Georgian government to slowly but steadily press for 
European and Euro-Atlantic integration: a path that needs 
patience and time. For its part, the West should support 
Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations and ongoing reforms, 
and at the same time to dissuade Russia from acting on its 
worst imperial instincts. Georgia now has multiple tasks in 
its relations with NATO, the EU and Russia, and it will take 
hard work for many years to come to succeed in achieving 
the goal. Finally, we can conclude that NATO membership 
is above all a political process, and that conditionality and a 
performance-based approach is secondary to the will of the 
alliance’s members regarding accession decision making, 
and that the external/Russian factor plays a decisive role in 
the EU/NATO integration process for post-Soviet countries. 
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